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In the 1995 film "Crimson Tide", an American submarine commander, 
played by Gene Hackman, reprimands his executive officer, played by 
Denzel Washington, for expressing doubts about a decision in the pres- 
ence of the crew. Well aware of the totalitarian nature of his leadership, 
and precluding any objections his executive officer may have about the 
abridgement of his rights of free speech, the commander emphatically 
pronounces "We're here to preserve democracy, not to practice it." The 
sub commander's theory of command, exemplified by this seemingly 
paradoxical form~dation, brings the world to the brink of nuclear war by 
attempting to fire his warheads in de-fiance of protocol, a war prevented 
' only by the democratically principled executive officer's refusal to sub- 
mit to his commanding officer's self-willed cancellation of the rules of 
democracy. Americans have historically suspended democratic principles 
when national security or certain values or institutions - Christianity, the 
Union, family, and, in the South, slavery - seemed threatened1 Wartime 
has been regarded as an acute situation critical enough to warrant sup- 
pression of free speech and free media, as evidenced by the Alien and Se- 
1 Pa~d L. Murphy, The Meaning of ljvee Speech (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1972), p. 15 
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dition Acts of the late eighteenth century, the Espionage Act during 
World War I, and tlie short-leashing of the American press during the 
Gulf War (a result of the lesson learned during the sixties from tlie nega- 
tive public opinion and anti-war protests at least in part generated by the 
extensive coverage of the Vietnam War). But there is more at work in the 
dynamics of "Crimson Tide" than the restraints on free speech and the 
suspensioii of democratic rule. There is a powerful irony embodied in the 
juxtaposition of the sub commander's desire to "preserve democracy" by 
suppressing a differing opinion, with his subsequent willingness to rash- 
ly unleash weapons of mass destruction, which would immediately lead 
to retributive attacks against the very democracy he so vigorously de- 
fends. We can almost sense the sub commander's lingering, perhaps la- 
tent, urge to press the button, to fire his potent weapons, because, God 
knows, it must be a hellish tease to be continuously in possession of such 
technological wizardry and not, perhaps ever, have the opportunity to use 
it, despite, or due to, its devastating capabilities. 
At the core of the dilemma is the virtually irresistible impulse to exer- 
cise the powers of technology, without regard to either the immediate or 
long-term effects upon traditional values - humanity in general and de- 
mocracy in particular. Having achieved the transformation from agrarian 
to industrial society, America is now well into the process of becoming a 
technologically-driven communications and information society. If we 
accept Willem H. Vanderburg's assertion that "techniques have increas- 
ingly displaced the customs and traditions of a society's ~ulture",~ we 
would do well to ask ourselves what customs and traditions of American 
society are made vulnerable by the emergence of computer-driven com- 
munications and information systems. Are the principles of democracy 
threatened or enhanced by cybercommunications and an unrestrained 
corps of journalists equipped with the tools of the electronic media? Will 
these principles be expanded and accelerated to the point of mutation and 
self-destruction or improved upon in a long-term positive manner? Can 
we allow the expansion of communications technology and new me- 
diums such as the Internet to go unchecked or is the growth of the state an 
2 Willem H. Vanderburg, "Political Imagination in a Teclmical Age", Deinocmtic Theory aid Technologi- 
cal Society (Armonk, New Yolrk: Shape,  1988), y .  6. 
acceptable countermeasure in response to the prolifcration of these tech- 
nological advances? 
In The Coming Information Age Wilson P. Dizard argues that com- 
mercial information systems, left to the fate of laissez-faire ecoiiomic 
policy, result in a widening gap between information-rich and informa- 
tion-poor, a process similar to the separation between knowers and doers 
in a technological ~ociety.~ What happens if and when these gaps occur 
in a multicult~u-a1 America, already challenged by accelerating fragmen- 
tation? There is reason to believe that information-based divisions will 
correspond to economic and racial divisions plaguing America today, 
t h ~ ~  exacerbating tensions between rich and poor, black and white, edu- 
cated and uneducated. Can we accept these costs in order to reap the 
benefits of improved information and communications. Vanderb~lrg ob- 
serves that 
[slociety continues to act as though our striving for micro-level rationality and efficien- 
cy will translate into ilnproveinents on the level of the whole ... this is not necessarily the 
case. Many of our advances on the inicro-level are undercut by massive problems on 
the macro-level.4 
The consequences cybercommunications will have upon American demo- 
cratic theory and practice and upon existing economic disparities have on- 
ly to a lesser degree initiated debate among citizens and politicians con- 
cerning the legislation directed at these expanding systems. Other age-old 
morality issues, such as the censorship of pornography and offensive 
speech, have been rejuvenated by the newer currents of political correct- 
ness, and prompted more radical reactions. Strange bedfellow alliances 
such as the National Organization of Women (NOW) and Christian coali- 
tions have exercised their influence upon Congress in hopes of regulating 
both new and established mediums, even though their efforts may result in 
the imposition of restrictions in conflict with the First Amendment. 
In the following sections I will briefly mention some of the potential 
effects cybercommunications may have upon democratic societies, and 
will then turn my attention to a few issues involving freedom of expres- 
3 Wilson P. Dizard, The Conzing Irzfonnnticrz Age (New York: Longman, 1982) pp. 186.190. 
4 Vanderburg, op. cit., p. 9. 
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sion and.mora1 responsibility in general, and try to place them in context 
with threatening Internet censorship. 
Cybercommunications and Democracy 
What consequences can cybercommunications have for American de- 
mocracy? Technophobes fear, primarily, the atomization of individual 
identities and the further erosion of social cohesion. Some argue that 
while mediums such as the Internet produce more democracy, they do not 
necessarily lead to better democracy. This is because the accelerated pace 
at which public opinion can be coalesced and communicated to politi- 
cians results in a further alienation 01 non-majority opinion. Public opin- 
ion, in such an effective mutation, has drastic consequences for a 
politician's ability to legislate for the long-term public good. The Inter- 
net, of course, is only one of the many utilities to grow out of giant leaps 
made in communications technologies this century. Before talcing the 
floor to vote on crucial issues, politicians receive stacks of faxes, phos- 
phorous waves of e(1ectronic)-mail, on top of messages/opinions trans- 
mitted via "old-fashioned" telephone and antiquated (snail) mail systems 
(satellites and air delivery notwithstanding). This is democracy with ex- 
ponential force, a hyper-democracy in which the role of civic-minded 
representation is greatly reduced and the self-interested voices of the peo- 
ple speak with deafening volume. With the weight of public opinion be- 
hind him and C-Span cameras in his face, the conscience and reason of 
the politician risks being chased into a forgotten corner along with any 
considerations for minority protection. 
Mark Poster, in a Wired (November 1995) article entitled "The Net as 
a Public Sphere?" sees related threats to the practice of democracy creat- 
ed by the spread of the Net. He argues that Internet newsgroups are not 
"nascent public spheres that will renew democracy", observing that 
"[d]isembodied exchange of video text is not a substitute for face-to-face 
meeting", which encourages "rational argument" and "consensus". Tra- 
ditional public spheres - "the ancient Greek agora, the New England 
town hall, the local church, the coffeehouse, the village square, and even 
the street corner" - places for "political discussion and action ... have 
largely been replaced by television and other forms of media - forms that 
arguably isolate citizens from one another rather than bring them togeth- 
er." One unifying characteristic of television, however, though it is being 
dissolved by the expansion of channels, is that it traditionally has suc- 
ceeded in broadcasting the same messages to large parts of the popula- 
tion, thereby providing a common ground of entertainment, information 
and discussion. The Internet threatens to undermine this f~mction of the 
mass media by providing radically easier access to a wider variety of di- 
vergent, polemical opinions to each on-line individual. Wilson P. Dizard 
reminds us that "[a] large democracy thrives only when its citizens share 
enough information, beliefs, and ass~lmptions to function toghether in a 
rough consens~~s."~ In a democracy ruled largely by public opinion, with 
only occasional and erratic checking by the Supreme Court, the further 
loss of shared values and ideas could have dire consequences: 
Is the fractionalization of audiences a net social gain? ... What happens when each ini- 
nority group can tune in to its own prophet? When there are no more Walter Cronkites 
each evening to reassure that despite all its afflictions the nation still  stand^?^ 
Cybercommunications, with its potential for social atrophy, combined 
with a nation already divided by economic disparities and ethnic, racial, 
gender and moral factions, is a potentially dangerous cocktail to mix. 
Add to this mixture the "powerful medicinew7 of free speech and the syn- 
ergism could radically transform democracy as we know it. 
If the tendency towards isolation continues for citizens of a society, it 
is perhaps inevitable that at some point they will accept it among their 
representatives. What happens to mutual interests, civic cooperation and 
' empathy if and when international summits and congressional sessions 
and the greater part of political activity take place in cyberspace? Poster 
mentions the loss of consensus and the will to compromise in his piece, 
and, I think, understanding, tolerance and benevolence risk being sacri- 
5 Dizard, op. cii., p. 12. 
6 Douglas Cater, cited in Dizad, op. cit., p. 141. 
7 In the Cohen decision of 1971, Justice Harlan said "[tlhe constitutional right of free expression is power- 
f ~ l l  medicine in a society as diverse and popullo~~s a  ours." Cited in Walter B e m ,  The First Amendntent and 
the Future ofAnzericnn Denzocracy (New Yorlc: Basic Books, 1976), y. 192. 
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ficed on the altar of technology as well. We cannot expect any type of cy- 
ber-fellowship to reproduce the positive feelings of community created 
by real-life gatherings f ~ d l  of eye-gazing, hand-shaking, back-slapping 
participants. The important qualities of physical warmth and contact risk 
being neglected in the wale of cybercommunications. The likely result 
will be a devaluation of policy created for the public good and an in- 
crease in special interests and self-serving motivations, relative even to 
the prevalence of these attitudes today. 
The Internet does at least three things to affect our concepts of commu- 
nity: 1) it physically separates community members, or at least chal- 
lenges the convenience and necessity of physical nearness; 2) it enables 
individuals to be more selective in choosing what messages they will 
grant attention to; and 3) it enables a larger number of people to express 
their ideas with greater frequency to an expanded audience. In other 
words, the Internet, if it becomes the, or even a , "way of lile", will re- 
duce physical contact, dilute society's base of shared knowledge (and, 
subsequently, its sense of history, tradition, values and goals), while gen- 
erating more ideas to be considered in the political process. 
There are legitimate fears about an electronically generated tyranny of 
the masses, but we certainly cannot derail or even regulate the Net because 
it promotes the political participation of more citizens, even though we 
may suspect that this will only increase incompetence in policy-making. 
No one, except anti-technology extremists, is arguing for pulling the plug 
out of communications technologies or imposing government regulations 
on these grounds. There simply is no "clear and present danger" to warrant 
suspension of First Amendment protection, only distant and obscure 
omens. In a free speech democracy the rise of a medium which creates op- 
portunities for diverse splinter groups and free-thinking individuals to ex- 
press their ideas in a public forum is seemingly a natural and positive de- 
velopment. Traditional (commercial) mass broadcast media have no obli- 
gation to assist these citizens in furthering their messages. To the contrary, 
they possess a godlike power to deny them access to their vehicles of com- 
munication, swayed only by factors related to profit. Broadcast media, as 
a form of public expression, are also subject to government censorship, 
unlike telephone systems, which are granted the status of common car- 
riers, and thus are conduits independent of and not responsible for content, 
though there can be sanctions against users concerning obscene speech. If 
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the Net is recognized as a common carrier, rather than a broadcast media, 
which allows capital and censorship to limit the exchange of controversial 
thoughts, it has the potential to function as a conduit for largely unfettered 
expression, subject only to the limits of private systems operators and the 
informal restraints of Netiquette. 
We know that improved communications and open discussion acceler- 
ate the pace at which countries move towards or broaden democracy. To- 
day countries without democratic traditions are already feeling the de- 
mocratizing influence of the Net: 
The Internet international computer network was pivotal in telling the world about thc 
pro-democracy deinoilstratioils at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Similarly, when Soviet 
hard-liners attempted to recapture the government from the leaders of reform, Internet 
communications, both internally and to the rest of the world, helped keep up the pres- 
sure that ultimately led to the collapse of the coup.8 
Furthermore: 
... the explosion of new media outlets means that centralized proposals to regulate speech 
are increasingly doomed to fail in practice, no matter how cogently they are framed in 
theory. It will be hard to police the "marketplace of ideas" when there are so many more 
markets to monitor. And if existing free-speech doctrine is still founded on the utopian 
premises epitomized by Justice Holmes' metaphor of a perfectly deregulated "Free trade 
in ideas", the new media technologies may fulfill Holmes' vision dramati~ally.~ 
If the Net promotes democracy, at least initially, and expands the free 
trade of ideas, perhaps we should not worry that it also defies regulation. 
But Barbara O'Brien claims that "[tlhe Net has become the world's bul- 
letin board, on which anyone with a cause and a keyboard can spread his 
views. The result is a yeast of human craziness that is far more frighten- 
ing than CD-ROM files of naked people", only to conclude "[dlon't get 
me wrong - I love the Internet. The free-for-all discussions on the Usenet 
have challenged my own assumptions and stimulated my thinking, and I 
believe the Internet should remain free and unregulated and open to all. 
I'm just not sure I want my children exposed to any of it."lo 
O'Brien's piece embodies some of the dilemmas and controversies 
8 Lance Rose, Netlnw (Berkely, California: McGsaw-Hill, 1995), p. 2. 
9 Jeffrey Rosen, "Cheap Speech", The New Yoi~lze~ 7 August 1995, pp. 75-76. 
10 Barbara O'Bden, "Cyberporil's No Big Deal, But Beware of Cybemuts", Intenzritiorznl Herald Tribune, 
1 September 1995, p. 9. 
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generated by the Net. She admits that Net liberty and the resulting welter 
of radical, subversive and paranoid political chatter are "frightening", yet 
opposes regulation, and wants it "open lo all", excluding her children, 
whom, we must assume, she, and not the state, should protect. Perhaps 
the most perplexing issues to arise from the rapid spread of modern com- 
munications involve the viability of American First Amendment democ- 
racy in the face of the actual and potentially infinite growth of anarchis- 
tic, racist, pornographic and other offensive expressions. 
Cybercommunicatins and Morality 
While the dissemination of political views, even those as far-fetched and 
anti-government as those O'Brien mentions, enjoy First Amendment pro- 
tection, pornography on the Net has already caused enough uproar to lead 
to passage of the Exon amendment. Signed by President Clinton in Feb- 
ruary 1996 as part of the Telecommunications Decency Act, the Exon 
amendment prohibits the transmission of pornographic words and images 
over the Net and allows for prosecution for verbal (e-mail) harassment. 
The Exon amendment has caused an understandable outcry from on-line 
libertarians who feel that this is the first step down a slippery slope end- 
ing in the ditch of political correctness and Puritan censorship. 
Marty Rimm's comprehensive, fear-inducing and flawed study of "Cy- 
berporn" in Time magazine (3 July 1995) was one of the driving forces 
behind reactionist support and Senate passage of the Exon amendment. 
Rimm and his alarming statistics have since been debunked, but the at- 
mosphere of fear and support for regulation remains. The Christians want 
pornography off the Net and so do the feminists. Most parents agree that 
childrens should be protected from it, but the questions of who should 
and can do the protecting and how cause conflict. These groups see ob- 
scenity and pornography as clear and present dangers to the moral fiber 
and gender perceptions of American citizens, and the Supreme Court has 
largely reinforced this attitude. By loolting back at some of these prece- 
dent-setting cases, we can perhaps identify some of the f~mdamental is- 
sues which are at stake in the current censorship debates. 
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In 1973 a New York radio station operated by Pacifica Foundation 
aired a monologue by comedian George Carlin based on a list of "seven 
dirty words7' banned from public expression. After complaints to the FCC 
from a father, the issue of whether dirty words may be broadcast over 
public airwaves reached the Supreme Court. The FCC based its objection 
on 18 United States Code, Section 1464, which states that "[w]hosoever 
utters any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio com- 
munication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 
than two years or both." 
Five justices, for various reasons, ruled in favor of the FCC, finding 
the monologue not obscene, but indecent, and citing the individual's right 
to be left alone. The distinction between obscenity and indecency de- 
serves some attention. While obscenity has been defined as expression 
emphasizing a prurient interest in sex and devoid of any other value, in- 
decency is related more to the type material which can be deemed appro- 
priate for children. So while certain material may not meet the criteria 
necessary to ban it on obscenity grounds, it may still be banned, if it has 
potential to be made available to children, as indecent. It is, in essence, a 
type of "heightened scrutiny" triggered by the risk of a child's exposure 
to objectionable material. 
The language of the Exon amendment allows for censorship in either 
case, and encumbers systems operators with the heavy burden of age ver- 
ification. Both Christian conservatives and feminists recognized and ex- 
ploited parental fear - anxiety about the possibility of their children find- 
ing their way to pornographic texts or images on the Internet - as the key 
for gaining Senate votes. The act also aims to outlaw e-mail harassment 
and thus opens up a whole other can of worms about what constitutes 
proper, or simply allowable, speech. In order to assess the wisdom of 
such control, we must ask ourselves if it is reasonable and constitutional 
for government to whitewash society to the point of presentability for 
children, a line of action which (inadvertently?) relieves parents of much 
of their responsibility. And, if so, how can it be achieved without dimin- 
ishing the lives of adults, in which many pleasures are found in the gray 
areas of acceptability? The issues to be decided and the reactionary at- 
mosphere they are decided in have important consequences for not only 
First Amendment freedoms, but the role of the family as well. 
What the Exon amendment regulates is substance of expression, since 
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the traditionally valid reasons for censorship - time, place and manner of 
speech - apply only ambiguously to the Net. Here no public facilities are 
disturbed and the transmitted material does not invade an on-line user's 
right to be free from pornography. The images are not imposingly trans- 
mitted to screens, a user goes in search of them. In the 1973 "seven dirty 
words" case, Justice Stevens argued that the pervasiveness of the broad- 
cast media justifies legislation concerning what and when programs may 
be broadcast, but this does little to bring the voluntary na t~~re  of down- 
loading into question. In my opinion, the argument does not even apply 
to the case at hand - the father who was offended by George Carlin7s 
monologue could have simply turned the radio off and preserved both his 
privacy and his son's purity. Or, better yet, he could have used the inci- 
dent as a point of departure for and explanation of his moral code. Relin- 
quishing control of these crucial, daily decisions to governmental decree 
equals the raising of a white flag over the already heavily shelled bastions 
of parental authority and competence. In an eloquent, ringing conclusion 
to his essay "Computer Porn Panic", Andrew Calcutt warns against the 
tendency to rely on the state as a moral guardian: 
The overall effect of this atmosphere is to create a dependency culture in which all of us 
- Net users and non-users alike - are encouraged to rely on the embrace of those in aw 
tliority to save us from each other and from the beast within ourselves. This is an insid- 
ious invitation. The more we come to rest on the bosom of the state (regardless of how 
soft it feels), the more we are rendered incapable of acting outside the clutches of ~ L I -  
thority. This is the authority trap; and unless we reject the politics of safety as expressed 
in the arguments for reigning in the Net, and the anti-people assumptions behind these 
arguments, we will find ourselves locked into it. This aspect of contemporary society is 
more dan gerous, debilitating and demoraliziiig than any amount of computer pornog- 
raphy could ever be." 
The campaigns to regulate pornography and offensive speech have re- 
sulted in such strange bedfellows as Christian fundamentalists and radi- 
cal feminists joining forces. The Christian coalitions emphasize the im- 
morality of pornography, while feminists are more concerned with the 
oppression of women inherent to the genre. Catherine M a c f i n o n  and 
her supporters argue that pornography is a violation of their civil rights 
11 Andrew Calcutt, "Computer Porn Pa~~ic", Fut~wes, volume 27, number 7, September 1995, p. 760. 
12 Nat Hento& Free Speech for Me B u t  Not for Thee. (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). 
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and that this supersedes any First Amendment considerations. Pornogra- 
phy, they say, is a subordination of women, sex-based discrimination, a 
perpetuator of male supremacy, a promoter of contempt for women, and, 
more concretely, an instigator of rape and violence against women.I2 
The danger that political correctness deters rational inquiries into the 
true prevalence and harmfulness of (computer) pornography does exist. 
But whether their assertions about the effects of pornography are true or 
not, and convincing evidence in these issues is hard to come by, the fact 
remains that many people have a strong aversion to pornography, vulgar 
speech, obscenity and indecency, for one reason or another. And if com- 
munities can muster a majority vote in favor of anti-porn legislation, 
should a democracy not recognize and abide by it? Not if the legislation 
is unconstitutional, and this is where the Supreme Court plays S L K ~  an 
important role. This is, theoretically, the last bastion of constitutional 
rights. Even if an overwhelming majority (the Senate approved the Exon 
amendment 84 to 16) passes legislation prohibitive of free expression, 
and survives presidential veto powers, the fate of the act will not be deter- 
mined until it endures the acid test of constitutionality in the Supreme 
Court. This, in the spirit and practice of checks and balances, serves to 
protect minorities from majoritarian tyranny, for instance when the mi- 
nority consists of free speech advocates and the majority consists of 
government censorship advocates. Even if so many citizens and their rep- 
resentatives agree that public morality depends on censorship for its 
health, the mechanisms of a constitutional democracy, for better or 
worse, make it possible for a group of nine justices to override this con- 
sensus. 
Walter Berns, a conservative legal scholar usually in opposition to ju- 
t dicial review, regards certain public expressions as offensive and disrup- 
tive enough to warrant legal restraints by way of government-initiated 
punishment. Keeping in mind the ambiguities of how "public" electronic 
speech on the Internet is, and the lapse of time since Berns published his 
opinions, we may still profit from an examination of his ideas in "Vulgar 
Speech and the Public Good" (The First Amendment and the Future of 
American Democracy, 1976). 
In his essay, Berns expresses a desire to expand the Supreme Court's 
list of valid reasons to exclude some speech from First Amendment pro- 
tection by adding substance to time, place and manner. He is confident 
124 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 29, 1996 
that legislators, law enforcement agencies and judges are capable of dis- 
tinguishing between vulgar (unprotected) speech and polite (protected) 
speech. Yet he can only do so himself, in an exercise of reductio ad absur- 
d~lm, by cursorily juxtaposing extreme cases of both. He admits that there 
"will be cases where the power to judge speech by its substance will be 
abused, but the answer to this is Supreme Court. review; and of course 
there will be borderline cases, but the law faces that problem in many, if 
not all areas" (pp. 200-201). 
Despite his efforts to disarm us by admitting his own flawed reasoning, 
Berns' logical hammerhead seems to have fallen off its shaft. Even allow- 
ing his ultimate (and sudden) faith in judicial review to go undisputed, 
we are still left with an argument that surrenders to the ambiguity of law 
and endorses the malting of more laws which are hopelessly inscrutable 
and open to subjective, or even radical, interpretation. Obscurity of law, 
inevitable as it may be in some, or even many cases, should be vigorous- 
ly opposed, for with its triumph it replaces the democratic rule of consti- 
tutional law with the tyrannical rule of whimsical man. 
If applied to the world of cybercommunications, the type of policy 
Berns proposes to protect public morality would have adverse effects on 
the openness of the Internet. With the spectre of regulation and the threats 
of cash damages or imprisonment hanging over their heads, systems op- 
erators and users will inevitably retreat into a defensive position towards 
the types of clearly benign materials and exchanges which can be permis- 
sibly transmitted over networks. If the wording of anti-pornography or 
anti-offensive speech legislation is enigmatic, and by nature it almost 
certainly will be, operators and users may find it wise to avoid even the 
gray areas of legal communications. Initiation of such caution constitutes 
a "chlling effect" upon expression, a phenomenon which First Amend- 
ment interpretations by the Supreme Court seek to prohibit. 
Berns' argument grows out of his discussion of Rosenfeld v. New Jer- 
sey. Rosenfeld, while addressing a public school board meeting, "repeat- 
edly criticized various teachers and board members" and "repeatedly de- 
nounced them as 'motherfuclters' ..." Now, admittedly this is highly of- 
fensive and improper language. The truth of Mark Twain's claim that 
Americans are the only people to be blessed with both freedom of speech 
and the sense not to use it is severely damaged by such examples. But 
does this type speech constitute unacceptable verbal harassment or is ex- 
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posure to this type of v~llgar behavior one of the risks inherent to life in a 
free speech democracy? Unfort~mately, it appears to be both. We certain- 
ly are within o~lr  ights to deplore such behavior and deem it personally 
unacceptable, to complain about it, to ignore it, or, less productively, to 
return it. Yet we must also recognize that this is nearly a worst-case sce- 
nario, and that laws cannot eliminate these with surgical precision. At 
best, laws can only suppress or punish such behavior, rendering any con- 
siderations of and counterpoints against the speaker's motivations and 
claims as meaningless. This is in contrast to Holmes' ideal in which bad 
ideas (Rosenfeld's words express extreme opinions more so than a vul- 
garity to be taken literally) are defeated by better ideas. And for all the 
admirable intentions Berns has for deeming "incivility as a public offense 
punishable by the public authority", there seems to be no consistent man- 
ner of or, arguably, reason for, doing so, a point recognized by the Court's 
majority in the Rosenfeld decision. 
Conclusion 
The seemingly irresistible force of technology has led us to accept the in- 
evitability of cybercommunications without considering its effects upon 
American democratic values. The greatly enhanced powers of the media 
and the rapid spread of the Internet will play major roles in how 
American and global democracies develop in the years to come. And 
there seems to be call for both concern and enthusiasm. But we cannot 
simply shrug our shoulders at the adverse ramifications these media may 
bear with them. Nor should we jump to the conclusion that only an ex- 
pansion of police powers can protect us from their negative effects. We 
must aclcnowledge the mixed blessing nature of these mediums and use 
this consciousness to resist the atomization of our own identities, the 
threatening social alienation from our geographical communities and the 
tyranny of the on-line masses cybercommunications has the potential to 
bring about. 
The Internet, aside from being perceived by so-called technophobes as 
eventually undermining the American political process, has also been 
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seen as a threat to public morality, and become the whipping boy of 
choice for diverse Christian, feminists and parental organizations. Their 
narrow agendas, in the spirit of political correctness, have led them to the 
conclusion that their rights not to be offended take precedence over the 
vital principles of the First Amendment. The prospect of facing a society 
of free-speaking individuals and unregulated media in the age of cyber- 
communications is a daunting one. But the lack of government interfer- 
ence does not leave coinmunities without other mechanisms to control 
unacceptable behavior. Informal restraints such as ostracization, denunci- 
ation and even impromptu economic pressures applied to the offender 
have traditionally sufficed in discouraging inappropriate speech, espe- 
cially when combined with proper parental involvement and guidance. 
Granted, a few incorrigible individuals and organizations will always re- 
main immune to and defiant of the kid glove approach of private sanc- 
tions, but their imperviousness should not lead to regulatory impetuous- 
ness on the part of their deplorers. T&ng recourse in the law in such 
matters involves an unnecessary abdication of personal responsibility 
and perpetuates a gravitation towards centralized regulation. What is 
needed instead is a recovery of private, individual and parental respon- 
sibility and the courage to declare independence from mediums which 
persist in subverting our values. 
Of course, it is one thing to get rid of our televisions if networks send 
too much sex and violence for our liking, and quite another to get rid of 
our telephones if someone insists on regularly making obscene calls to 
us. With the Internet, an alternative power of choice reside within us; we 
can both keep it and decide what we are confronted with. It seems unnec- 
essary and unreasonable to call upon state authority if we or even our 
children happen upon a pornographic image or are exposed to offensive 
language in a discussion group. And, with the passage of the Exon 
amendment, it is frightening to realize how eager it is to respond. 
POWERFUL MEDICINE 
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